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ARTICLES
TOWARD A MODERN DEFAMATION LAW IN VIRGINIA:
QUESTIONS ANSWERED, QUESTIONS RAISED
David C. Kohler*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the United States Supreme Court decided in 1964 that defamatory statements were entitled to some protection under the
first amendment,1 the law of defamation has been in a virtual state
of chaos.2 For more than twenty years, state courts have been
faced with the task of adapting their own rules governing libel and
slander-rules which in many cases were already complex and confusing-with newly fashioned, rapidly changing, and often unpredictable layers of first amendment doctrine. s
In only a few cases before 1985 had the Virginia Supreme Court
touched on the many difficult questions raised by this newly
emerging doctrine, and those cases barely scratched the surface.4
* Associate, Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & Chappell, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1975,
Duke University; J.D., 1978, Duke University School of Law.
The author wishes to thank Stanley P. Wellman and Virginia E. Hench for their assistance in researching this article. Additionally, the author expresses his appreciation to Alexander Weilford for his editorial assistance and generous guidance.
1. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. At a recent libel symposium sponsored by the American Bar Association and American
Newspaper Publisher's Association, Professor Marc Franklin of Stanford University likened
the subject to visiting a zoo. As reported in the Media Law Reporter:
First, Franklin said, there is the "camel question;" like that animal libel law is an
oddity, operated on by successive generations of judges over several hundred years.
Next, there is the "elephant question;" examining libel law is like the proverbial examination of an elephant by six blind men, each finding a different animal, he said.
Finally, Franklin said, there is the cage for the "new animal," an undetermined future form of libel law.
News Notes, 12 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) No. 26 (Apr. 1, 1986).
3. An excellent overview of the development of constitutional doctrine relating to defamation is contained in R. SAcK, LmEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMs 1-38 (1980). See also
B. SANFORD, LmEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LITIGATION 1-34 (1985).
4. Only two cases have significant precedential value. See Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884,
275 S.E.2d 632 (1981), appealedsub nom. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713
(1985), cert. denied, Fleming v. Moore, 105 S. Ct. 3513 (1985), cert. denied, Port Packet

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:3

In February, 1985, however, the floodgates opened. Since then, the
Virginia Supreme Court has issued five opinions that will affect
virtually all actions for defamation in the commonwealth. Part I of
this article reviews those opinions and discusses generally their effect on defamation law in Virginia. Part II examines in greater detail some of the more important questions raised by this recent
wave of decisions.

II.
A.

THE CASES

Gazette, Inc. v. Harris: The Standard of Liability and More

The first and possibly most significant shot in the battle of rede5
fining Virginia defamation law was fired in Gazette, Inc. v. Harris,
an opinion that considered a wide range of issues, including the
standard of liability in actions brought by private individuals seeking compensatory damages, the scope of appellate review of defamation verdicts, and the proper measure of damages for purely intangible injuries. The Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in Harris
actually decided a quartet of cases, which had been consolidated
for decision. All of the cases were brought by private individuals.
Three of them were against small newspapers, while the fourth was
against an individual defendant.
In the first case, Harris,' three persons filed suit against The Gazette, a small weekly newspaper published in Goochland and Powhatan counties. 7 The case arose out of a report in the public
records section of the newspaper on two incidents of aggravated
sexual battery involving children." In its story, The Gazette set
forth information taken from the Goochland County Juvenile and
Corp. v. Lewis, 105 S. Ct. 3528 (1985), later proceeding, Fleming v. Moore, 780 F.2d 438
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644 (1986) (because Fleming v. Moore came before
the Supreme Court a second time as part of Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, the first Fleming case
will hereinafter be referred to as Fleming I); see also Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke,
216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976). Two other cases touched on the constitutionalization of
defamation law, but one has been overruled while the other was reversed. See Sanders v.
Times-World Corp., 213 Va. 369, 192 S.E.2d 754 (1972), overruled, Gazette, Inc. v. Harris,
229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 192 S.E.2d 737 (1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
5. 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied, Fleming v. Moore, 105 S. Ct. 3513, cert. denied,
Port Packet Corp. v. Lewis, 105 S. Ct. 3528 (1985), later proceeding,Fleming v. Moore, 780
F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644 (1986).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 20, 325 S.E.2d at 728.
8. Id.
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Domestic Relations Court docket book.9 While all the information
reported was factually accurate, the column headings in the docket
book designating the status of the various parties (i.e., accused,
complainant) were omitted."0 Because these column headings had
been omitted, the plaintiffs, who were the parents of the allegedly
victimized children, argued that the report was ambiguous and
could be read as accusing them of having committed the crime of
aggravated sexual battery." The jury agreed and awarded James
and Virginia Harris and Barbara Sweeney compensatory damages
in the amounts of $30,000, $10,000, and $10,000, respectively. 2 No
punitive damages were awarded."3
14
The second case, CharlottesvilleNewspaper, Inc. v. Matthews,
arose out of an article published in The Daily Progress in Charlottesville, Virginia, about a rape trial which resulted in an acquittal on the charge of rape, but a conviction for the crime of fornication.' 5 Plaintiff, the alleged rape victim, was referred to in the
story as Miss Mathews, and it was reported that she was pregnant
at the time of the trial.' Plaintiff was not, in fact, unmarried, and
she claimed that the error, when read in conjunction with the report of her pregnancy, implied that she had committed the crime
of fornication and had become pregnant from the act.' 7 The jury
agreed and assessed compensatory damages against the newspaper
in the amount of $25,000.16 Plaintiff had abandoned her claim for
punitive damages.
The third newspaper case, Port Packet Corp. v. Lewis,", arose in
Alexandria, Virginia, out of an article on child abuse published by
The Port Packet.20 In addition to discussing the subject generally,
the article reported on two suspected incidents of abuse, but did
not give the names of the allegedly abused children or any other
parties involved. 2 ' The alleged victim in one of the cases, who was
9. Id. at 20-21, 325 S.E.2d at 728-29.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 20, 325 S.E.2d at 728.
12. Id. at 21, 325 S.E.2d at 728.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 27-32, 325 S.E.2d at 732-35.
15. Id. at 27-28, 325 S.E.2d at 732-33.
16. Id. at 27, 325 S.E.2d at 732-33.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 28, 325 S.E.2d at 732.
119. Id. at 32-43, 325 S.E.2d at 735-42.
20. Id. at 32, 325 S.E.2d at 735.
21. Id. at 33-34, 325 S.E.2d at 736-37.
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fictitiously named Mark, was identified only as a nine-month old
boy who had recently died of a fractured skull at Alexandria Hospital in early June.2 2 Testimony at trial showed that this was the
only information that had been given to the reporter about the
identity of the child, and he did not know who Mark or his parents
were.23 Nevertheless, Mark's parents, who were the plaintiffs in the
case, came forward, alleging that they had been accused of murdering their child.24 Plaintiffs proved at trial that the child's death
was the result of an accident, and that the police investigation had
been dropped.25 The jury awarded compensatory damages of
$50,000 and punitive damages of $100,000.26

The final case, Fleming v. Moore,27 involved two individuals, and
was before the supreme court for the second time.28 Plaintiff, a
white professor at the University of Virginia, claimed to have been
libeled by an advertisement published in The Cavalier Daily accusing him of racism. 29 Defendant, a black real estate developer,
placed the advertisement when his request to develop land next to
plaintiff's residence was denied.30 The jury awarded plaintiff
$100,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 punitive damages,
plus twelve percent interest on the punitive damages from January
16, 1977.1

1. The Dominant Issue
Described by the court as the "dominant issue," the standard of
fault in Virginia applicable to private persons who seek compensatory damages in defamation actions was previously a question of
considerable uncertainty.3 2 The question arose in 1974 when the
22. Id. at 33, 325 S.E.2d at 736.
23. Id. at 36, 325 S.E.2d at 739.
24. Id. at 32, 325 S.E.2d at 735.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 43-51, 325 S.E.2d at 742-47.
28. See Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981) (Fleming I-opinion issued
by Virginia Supreme Court upon the first review of Fleming).
29. Id. at 43, 325 S.E.2d at 742.
30. Id. at 44-45, 325 S.E.2d at 743.
31. Id. at 43, 325 S.E.2d at 742.
32. See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 8-17, 325 S.E.2d 713, 723-26 (1985). Three
federal courts had split on the question, two applying a negligence standard while the third
required publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Compare
General Prods. Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Va. 1981) and Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Va. 1979) with Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d
824 (D.D.C. 1977).
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United States Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 s
held that in defamation cases brought by private persons for compensatory damages3 4 the states were free to set their own standards
of liability, so long as they did not impose liability without fault.
Effectively, Gertz set negligence as the constitutional minimum.2
The four cases before the Virginia Supreme Court involved
plaintiffs who had been classified by the trial courts as private persons, not public officials or public figures.3 On appeal, the defendants argued that a negligence standard was intolerably vague and
would necessarily result in substantial restrictions on free speech.37
Joining the majority of states that have considered the issue, 3s the
court rejected these arguments, holding that where a private person sues for compensatory damages, recovery may be had "upon
proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the publication was
false, and that the defendant either knew it to be false.

. .

or ac-

ted negligently in failing to ascertain the facts on which the publication was based."' 9 The standard is applicable to media and non33. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), later proceeding, 680 F. 2d (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

1226 (1983).
34. Gertz held that punitive damages can be recovered only upon clear and convincing

proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
35. See generally R.

SACK,

supra note 3, at 207.

36. In a series of earlier cases, the United States Supreme Court required that public
figures and public officials prove by clear and convincing evidence publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth before recovering any damages. See, e.g.,
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public figures); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials). While knowledge of falsity is self-defining,
reckless disregard for the truth is a term of art requiring a showing that the defendant
published despite a "high degree of awareness of. . .probable falsity." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); see, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)
("There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."). In the three Harris cases
involving press defendants, there was no contention that any of the plaintiffs were either
public officials or public figures. However, in Fleming, the defendant did argue that the
plaintiff was a public figure, having injected himself into a land use controversy. In Fleming
I, the court held that plaintiff Moore was not a public figure. See Fleming I, 221 Va. 884,
891-92, 275 S.E.2d 632, 637 (1981). In the second case, it declined to review the issue again.
Harris,229 Va. at 43, 325 S.E.2d at 742.
37. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Virginia Press Associaiton in support of Appeal
By Port Packet Corp., Harris,229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985) (No. 830651).
38. In Harris,the court pointed out that at least 30 states had adopted a negligence standard. 229 Va. at 16, 325 S.E.2d at 726.
39. Id. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 724-25. In placing the burden of proving falsity as well as fault
on the plaintiff, the Virginia Supreme Court anticipated by slightly more than one year the
United States Supreme Court's resolution of that issue. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, 106 S.Ct. 1558 (1986), cert. denied & appeal dismissed, 106 S.Ct. 1784 (1986).
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media defendants alike,40 but is limited "to circumstances where
the defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation
apparent.

'41

If the offending words do not present substantial

reputational danger, the plaintiff must prove publication of a
known or reckless falsity-the standard applicable to public officials and public figures.42
Justices Harrison and Poff dissented on the ground that a negligence standard would inadequately protect free speech. Justice
Harrison would have required proof of publication with knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,43 while Justice Poff
favored an intermediate standard of gross negligence.44
2. The Requirement of Identification
To be actionable, a defamation must be "of and concerning" the
plaintiff; the plaintiff must show that he or she was identified by
the offending publication. 45 In the Port Packet case, the defendants contended that this requirement had not been satisfied, since
neither the plaintiffs nor their son had been named in the story.
The supreme court rejected the argument on the grounds "that the
publication was 'in its description or identification such as to lead
those who knew or knew of the plaintiff[s] to believe that the article was intended to refer to [them].' ,,46 Sufficient identifying details were found in the inclusion of "the child's sex and age, the
nature of his injuries, when he died, how he died, the hospital
where he died, and how long he lived after sustaining the injuries.

' 47

Although neither the reporter nor the editor knew the iden-

tity of the child, the article and an accompanying editorial focused
on parents of abused children, and the editorial advanced publicity
as a means to combat child abuse. From these facts, the court held
40. Harris, 229 Va. at 17, 325 S.E.2d at 726.
41. Id. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 725.
42. See supra note 36; see also infra text accompanying notes 169-86 for a more complete
discussion of this issue.
43. Harris, 229 Va. at 53-54, 325 S.E.2d at 748-49 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 52-53, 325 S.E.2d at 747-48 (Poff, J., dissenting). This is a standard similar to
the one adopted by New York, requiring the plaintiff to prove gross irresponsibility by the
publisher. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
45. See, e.g., Ewell v. Boutwell, 138 Va. 402, 413, 121 S.E. 912, 915 (1924).
46. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 37, 325 S.E.2d 713, 738 (1985) (quoting Butler v.
News-Leader Co., 104 Va. 1, 7, 51 S.E. 213, 215 (1905)).
47. Harris, 229 Va. at 37-38, 325 S.E.2d at 738.
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that "the jury could reasonably conclude that the newspaper intended to refer directly to 'Mark's' abusers, his . . . parents, and
therefore, indirectly to the [plaintiffs]. 48 In explaining its holding,
the court emphasized, however, that "[tihis was not simply a report stating that an infant recently died in a local hospital of head
injuries in a case of suspected child abuse. ' 49 In such a case the
publication presumably would not have been actionable.
3.

The Status of Common Law Privilege

Because the Harris court established a new standard for the recovery of compensatory damages, it had to determine whether the
traditional common law privileges 50 retained their vitality, or were
subsumed by the new standard. Recognizing that the malice required to defeat a common law privilege, which was defined by the
court as "personal spite, or ill will, independent of the occasion on
which the communication was made," was different from negligence, it opted in favor of retaining the privileges. 5 1Thus, a defendant in a defamation suit who negligently publishes a defamatory
falsehood may still defeat liability if he can establish that the occasion of publication was a privileged one.
4. The Standard for Appellate Review
In all the cases before it, the court was called on to determine by
what standard an appellate court is to review a jury's finding that
the applicable standard of fault was violated. To fix the proper
scope of appellate review, the court had to interpret the 1984 deci48. Id. at 39, 325 S.E.2d at 739.
49. Id. at 38, 325 S.E.2d at 738.
50. At common law, a privilege to publish defamatory words was recognized "where the
author or publisher ... acted in the bona fide discharge of a public or private duty, legal or
moral, or in the prosecution of his own rights or interests." Williams Printing Co. v. Sanders, 113 Va. 156, 176, 73 S.E. 472, 476 (1912). Some of the more common privileged occasions include publication of fair and substantially accurate reports of public records, see,
e.g., Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 198 Va. 154, 93 S.E.2d 274 (1956); comments by an
employer to his employees and other interested persons concerning the reason for the discharge of an employee, see, e.g., Kroger Co. v. Young, 210 Va. 564, 172 S.E.2d 720 (1970);
and statements made by one in his own defense, see, e.g., Haycox v. Dunn, 200 Va. 212, 104
S.E.2d 800 (1958). To defeat a privilege, the plaintiff must show that the offending words
were published with common law malice, or that the privilege was otherwise exceeded, such
as by the use of excessively intemperate language. See, e.g., Great Coastal Express, Inc. v.
Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 154-55, 334 S.E.2d 846, 853-54 (1985). See generally infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
51. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 18, 325 S.E.2d 713, 727 (1985).
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sion of the United States Supreme Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.52 Bose held that before affirming a finding of publication with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth-the standard fashioned in the
seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan5s-the reviewing
court must conduct an independent examination of the entire record to determine whether the finding is supported by clear and
convincing evidence.5 4 The Virginia Supreme Court recognized
that the requirement of independent review imposed by Bose is a
rule of federal constitutional law, and must be applied to all issues
requiring application of the New York Times standard."
On the question of an award of compensatory damages under a
negligence standard, the court rejected the heightened review standards of Bose, reasoning that "[t]he negligence standard for compensatory damages that we have adopted is not a matter of governing federal constitutional law. '5 6 The court held that the
standard of review mandated by section 8.01-680 of the Virginia
Code-requiring that a judgment be plainly wrong or without evidence to support it-would continue to govern."'
5.

Proof of New York Times Malice

In both the Port Packet and Fleming cases, the jury had
awarded substantial punitive damages after determining that the
defendants had published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Applying the Bose standard of review, the supreme court reversed the finding in Port Packet, but affirmed it in
Fleming. In Port Packet, the court found importance in the fact
that the story had been "researched in depth" and "edited in a
deliberate fashion with consideration given to accuracy."58 The
court also noted that the newspaper had relied on an "official
source" in preparing the article, and that the editor approving it
believed that they had "complied with [the] standards of proper
52. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
53. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499.
55. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 19, 325 S.E.2d 713, 727 (1985). This includes cases
brought by public officials or public figures and those brought by private figures where the
offending words do not make substantial danger to reputation apparent and where punitive
damages are sought. See supra notes 34, 36; see also infra text accompanying notes 167-86.
56. Harris, 229 Va. at 20, 325 S.E.2d at 728.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 42, 325 S.E.2d at 741.
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journalism. 5s The plaintiff had argued that the reporter fabricated
his description of the alleged incident of child abuse as "a vicious
attack, . . . child beating, . . . [and] murder."60 The police officer

who had been the source for the story testified that he only told
the reporter that the case was one of suspected child abuse which
was being treated as a homicide. 1 Nevertheless, the court rejected
the plaintiff's attempts to elevate these editorial judgments to the
level of deliberate or reckless falsification, effectively holding that
publishers are entitled to choose their own words of description,
providing there is some basis for doing so.62
The court reached a different conclusion in Fleming, finding that
there was ample evidence that the defendant had published with
reckless disregard for the truth. In reviewing the evidence
presented by the plaintiff, the court stated that "[e]valuation of
this element of proof must be from an objective standpoint, not
merely from a subjective perspective."63 This statement should not
be misinterpreted, as the United States Supreme Court's decisions
clearly indicate that the New York Times fault standard is a subjective one. 64 What the court doubtless was saying is that proof of
the subjective standard may, in a proper case, be inferred from objective factors.65 This view is supported by the court's observation
that the defendant had "abandoned all judgment and reason in
composing and publishing the advertisement," and had no legitimate basis to make many of the charges leveled. 66
59. Id.; see infra note 135 (concerning the role of expert testimony in such cases).
60. Harris,229 Va. at 35, 325 S.E.2d at 737.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 42-43, 325 S.E.2d at 741-42; see also Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726 (4th Cir.
1980).
63. Harris,229 Va. at 50, 325 S.E.2d at 746.
64. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511
n.30 (1984); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Recently, Justice Stevens
recognized that, for the fault standard to be met, the publisher "must come close to willfully

blinding itself to the falsity of its utterance." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106
S. Ct. 1558, 1567 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Other cases have held that subjective malice can be inferred from accumulation of
various objective indicia. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzberg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 313
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986).

66. Harris,229 Va. at 50, 325 S.E.2d at 746. See generally R SACK, supra note 3, at 214-
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Damages

In all four cases, the court was called on to review the size of
various awards of compensatory and punitive damages. A common
thread running through the compensatory damage awards was that
the claimed injuries were intangible; in none of the cases did the
plaintiffs prove any loss of money or any medical consequences of
the emotional distress allegedly suffered. The damages allegedly
suffered were injuries to reputation, humiliation, and emotional
distress. Faced with such claims, the court affirmed compensatory
awards of $50,000 or less, but vacated the award of $100,000 compensatory damages in Fleming, holding that it bore no relationship
to the actual loss sustained.67 It thus seems reasonable to suggest,
in light of these results, that the court may pay particularly close
attention to very large awards which compensate a party for injuries of an intangible nature. 88
In the Fleming case, the court also found grossly excessive a punitive damages award of $250,000. The propriety of this award was
reviewed under the heightened standard of Bose:
The independent examination we make on the punitive-damage issue is not limited to proof of punitive liability. The First Amendment implications flowing from the amount of such an award require
the reviewing court to consider the effect of approval of such an
award on self-censorship in derogation of the right of free speech. 9
In relation to the defendant's net worth of approximately
$1,000,000, the award was held to be "destructive. 7 0 Additionally,
the court emphasized the lack of any tangible injury, recognizing
that, "[w]hile the elements of compensatory damages differ from
the requirements to establish punitive damages, many factors ap71
ply to both on appeal.
67. The court ordered that the trial court require the plaintiff to remit a "substantial
portion of his recovery" or face a new trial on the issue of damages only. Gazette, Inc. v.
Harris, 229 Va. 1, 48, 325 S.E.2d 713, 745 (1985).
68. Cf. Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 433-43, 166 S.E. 550, 555 (1932) (expressing concern
about claims for purely emotional injuries). The concern over excessive damage awards in
libel cases is widespread. See generally Defamation Trials and Damage Awards-Updating
the Franklin Studies, 4 LinEL DEF. RESOURCE CENTER BULL. 2 (Aug. 15, 1985); Franklin,
Suing the Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 795 (1981);
Barbus, New Challenge to Press Freedom, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1984, (Magazine), at 49.
69. Harris, 229 Va. at 50, 325 S.E.2d at 746.
70. Id. at 51, 325 S.E.2d at 746-47.
71. Id. at 51, 325 S.E.2d at 747.
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B. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington: The Purely Private
Defamation
In Great CoastalExpress, Inc. v. Ellington,2 the court faced a
claim for defamation of a purely private nature: the plaintiff was
neither a public official nor a public figure, and the subject matter
of the offending words involved no matter of general public concern. The principal question presented was the extent to which the
new rules articulated in Harris, which had involved words published on matters of general concern to the public, would apply to
matters not of legitimate public interest.
Great Coastal arose out of the termination of Robert Ellington's
employment as a truck driver. Mr. Ellington complained that he
was defamed when the company gave the reason for his discharge
as attempted bribery of a company mechanic in connection with an
effort to have the r.p.m.'s of his truck increased. 3 Ellington denied
that he had offered the mechanic any bribe, and the company
presented no evidence that he had, instead relying principally on
its contention that the offending words were never spoken by a
company official. 4 The jury rejected this defense and awarded Ellington $20,000 compensatory damages and $50,000 punitive
damages.7 5
1.

Per Se Defamation and Presumed Damages

The trial court instructed the jury that a charge of "commercial
bribery" was defamatory per se, and that damages were thus presumed. Great Coastal challenged this instruction, arguing that
whether words constitute a per se defamation is a jury question.
This argument was easily dispensed with by the court. Whether
such words were actionable per se depended on whether they
charged the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. 0
72. 230 Va. 142, 334 S.E.2d 846 (1985).
73. Id. at 145, 334 S.E.2d at 849.
74. Id. at 156, 334 S.E.2d at 855.
75. Id. at 146, 334 S.E.2d at 849.
76. See id. at 146-47, 334 S.E.2d at 849-50. Virginia recognizes four categories of defamatory words that are actionable per se:
(1) Those which impute to a person the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted

and punished.
(2) Those which impute that a person is infected with some contagious disease,
where if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society.
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Breaking no new ground, the court properly held that this issue
presented a question of law, and that the circuit court's decision of
the issue had been correct.7 7
2.

The Standard Applicable to Purely Private Defamations

The court in Great Coastalfaced the difficult issue of reconciling
Virginia's common law, as modified by Harris, with recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court relating to defamations
involving no matter of public concern. In 1974, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,7 the United States Supreme Court reversed the common law rules relating to presumed or punitive damages, holding
that absent clear and convincing proof of a knowing or reckless
falsity, such damages are unconstitutional. 9 In addition, the Gertz
Court ruled that the common law rule of strict liability was no
longer permissible in defamation cases.80 Shortly before the decision in Great Coastal, however, the United States Supreme Court
decided Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc." In
its plurality opinion, the Court seems to have effected a partial return to the common law, holding that, in defamation cases involving no issue of public concern, presumed and punitive damages can
be awarded even in the absence of a knowing or reckless falsity.2
(3) Those which impute to a person unfitness to perform the duties of an office or
employment of profit, or want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such an
office or employment.
(4) Those which prejudice such person in his or her profession or trade. All other
defamatory words which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion a person special damages are actionable.
Id. (citing Fleming I, 221 Va. 884, 889, 275 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1981)); see infra text accompanying notes 216-55.
77. See Great Coastal, 230 Va. at 148, 334 S.E.2d at 850. In Fleming I, the defendant
conceded that the issue was for the court, not the jury. See Fleming I, 221 Va. at 889, 275
S.E.2d at 635. Virginia courts have long been deciding the question of moral turpitude as a
matter of law. See, e.g., Bell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 526, 538, 189 S.E. 441, 447 (1937).
78. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), later proceeding, 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1226 (1983).
79. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
80. Id. at 340; see also supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
81. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
82. Id. at 2944-46. The plurality suggests that Gertz was never intended to decide
whether constitutional limitations on presumed and punitive damages apply in cases of defamation not involving an issue of public concern. Id. at 2944. More persuasively, the dissent
argues that a professed distrust of empowering courts to decide what is and what is not of
public concern compelled the Court in Gertz to hold as it did. See id. at 2959-60 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The plurality's opinion is devoid of any attempt to define what constitutes a question of general public concern.
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Only three Justices expressed this view,83 although Justice White
and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result;8 4 four Justices
dissented.8 5 The Virginia Supreme Court thus was presented with
the task of determining how these less than clear pronouncements
of the United States Supreme Court should be applied in Virginia.
Although professing to "fully subscribe"86 to the plurality's opinion in Greenmoss Builders, the Virginia Supreme Court actually
accepted only that part of the opinion revitalizing the doctrine of
presumed damages in cases involving purely private disputes: "[I]f
the published words are determined by the trial judge to be actionable per se at common law, compenatory [sic] damages for injury
87
to reputation, humiliation, and embarrassment are presumed.
On the question of when punitive damages can be recovered, the
court declined to follow the lead in Greenmoss Builders. Instead,
the court relied on the policy concerns expressed in Fleming 1,8'
which held that punitive damages may be recovered only upon
clear and convincing proof of a knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.8 9 Finally, notwithstanding Greenmoss Builders,
the court decided that the negligence standard articulated in Harris, including its limitation in cases where no substantial damage
to reputation is apparent, applies also to defamation cases arising
out of the publication of words involving no issue of general public
concern.90 In reality then, the Virginia Supreme Court carefully
83. See id. at 2940. The opinion of Justice Powell was joined by Justices O'Connor and
Rehnqust.
84. Id. at 2948-54. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White took the opportunity to criticize generally the evolution of constitutional doctrine affecting defamation cases. See id.
Both Justices expressed misgivings about the application of the rules first articulated in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Justice White suggested that the
case should be overruled, at least in part. See Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. at 2950-51.
Clearly, though, a substantial majority of the Court does not agree. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
85. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. at 2954-65. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
86. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 151, 334 S.E.2d 846, 852 (1985).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 151, 334 S.E.2d at 853. In Fleming I, the court expressed concern over the
unbridled use of punitive damages to punish speech. See Fleming I, 221 Va. 884, 893, 275
S.E.2d 623, 638 (1981) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350). The court's concerns over abuse of
this power appears to be justified by recent analyses of damage awards in defamation cases.
See supra note 68.
89. Fleming I, 221 Va. at 893, 275 S.E.2d at 638.
90. See Great Coastal,230 Va. at 151-52, 334 S.E.2d at 852. Greenmoss Builders did not
consider whether the common law standard of strict liability could be employed in nonpublic concern defamation cases. See Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. at 2939. However, in
light of the Court's rejection of Gertz in that context and its apparent revitalization of the
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considered the implications of Greenmoss Builders, and chose only
those aspects of the case that it believed struck a proper balance
between the right of free expression and the protection of a person's reputation.
3. Qualified Privilege
Also presented in Great Coastal was the scope of protection offered by the various defamation privileges recognized at common
law. 1 The court's opinion on this point is significant for several
reasons.
The court clearly defined what kinds of conduct may constitute
an abuse of a common law privilege. Great Coastal argued on appeal that only clear and convincing proof of New York Times malice-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth-should constitute an abuse of a privilege. 92 The court rejected this view, holding that, in addition to New York Times malice, a common law privilege can be defeated by "common law malice," ' 3 which includes ill will, excessive publication, or willful
disregard for the plaintiff's rights.94 At the same time, while refusing to adopt New York Times malice as the only circumstance concommon law, such an argument would not be without force. See PhiladelphiaNewspapers,
106 S.Ct. at 1563 ("When the speech is of exclusively private concern ... the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the features of
the common law landscape.").
91. The plaintiff conceded that a common law privilege applied. Great Coastal Express,
Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 153, 334 S.E.2d 846, 853 (1985). See generally supra note 50.
92. Great Coastal, 230 Va. at 154, 334 S.E.2d at 854.
93. Id. The court held that proof of New York Times malice is, of course, one form of
improper conduct that will constitute an abuse of a privilege. Id. In its opinion, the court
recognized the confusion that exists over use of the phrase "actual malice" to describe both
common law and New York Times concepts of malice, and explained that common law malice is a "different and broader concept." See id. at 149 n.3, 334 S.E.2d at 851 n.3.
94. The Virginia Supreme Court quoted the instruction given by the circuit court as illustrating the kinds of improper conduct that will constitute an abuse of privilege. That instruction included: New York Times malice; the use of language which is intemperate or
disproportionate in strength and violence to the occasion; the absence of good faith; unnecessary publicity; the gratification of some sinister or corrupt motive such as hatred, revenge,
personal spite, ill will, or desire to injure the plaintiff; or gross indifference or recklessness as
to amount to a wanton and willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. Id. at 153-54, 334
S.E.2d at 853-54.
By approving the elements of the circuit court's instruction, the supreme court appears
comprehensively to have defined what sorts of conduct will constitute an abuse of common
law privilege. See id. at 154, 334 S.E.2d at 854. At the same time, the supreme court emphasized that only those elements of the instruction supported by the evidence should be included in any given case. See id. at 155, 334 S.E.2d at 854.

1986]

MODERN DEFAMATION LAW

stituting an abuse of privilege, the court did adopt clear and convincing evidence, the standard applicable to cases involving New
York Times malice, as the burden of proof required to override the
common law privileges. 5 The court did this because it would be
too confusing to expect a jury to master different burdens of proof
to determine whether there was an abuse of the various constitutional and common law privileges that often both apply in a given
defamation case."6
C. Chaves v. Johnson and Crawford v. United Steel Workers:
Protection for Expressions of Opinion
In two cases, Chaves v. Johnson9 7 and Crawford v. United Steel
Workers,"5 the Virginia Supreme Court, in radically different contexts, considered the actionability of statements of opinion. Unfortunately, though, the cases may raise more questions than they
99
answer.
Chaves arose out of a proposed study by the City of Fredericksburg of its office space needs. Plaintiff Chaves, an architect, was
the successful bidder for the contract to do the study. Defendant
Johnson, another architect, was an unsuccessful bidder. After
Chaves submitted his plan, the city reached an impasse over how
to proceed. At that point, Johnson sent a letter to each council
member complaining that he had not been selected to prepare the
study, and stating that "it seems unreasonable to me that Council
would retain an Architect who has had no prior experience in this
type of project and agree to pay an Architectural fee that is over
50% more than what could be considered a reasonable fee."' 10 0 A
week after receiving this letter, the City Council terminated
Chaves' contract and retained Johnson. 10 1 Shortly thereafter,
Chaves filed a two count motion for judgment claiming, first, defamation, and second, tortious interference with his contractual
rights. The jury awarded Chaves $70,000 actual damages under
both counts, and under the defamation count only $15,000 dam95. Id. at 154, 334 S.E.2d at 854.
96. Id.
97. 230 Va. 112, 335 S.E.2d 97 (1985).
98. 230 Va. 217, 335 S.E.2d 828 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1490 (1986).
99. See infra notes 187-215 and accompanying text.
100. Chaves, 230 Va. at 115, 335 S.E.2d at 99.
101. Id. at 117, 335 S.E.2d at 100-01. At trial, eight of the eleven council members testified, each denying that they had been influenced by the letter. Id. at 118, 335 S.E.2d at 101.
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ages for humiliation and injury to personal reputation and $15,000
punitive damages. 102 The circuit court set aside the verdict on both
counts. While reversing the circuit court's ruling on the tortious
interference claim,108 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
action with respect to defamation, in large part 0 4 on the grounds
that
102. Id.
103. Id. at 122, 335 S.E.2d at 103-04. In reinstating the verdict as it applied to the tortious interference claim, the court rejected the defendant's argument that his conduct was
protected by the first amendment, reasoning that such an "intentional wrong to the property rights of another" is outside the scope of protection afforded by the Constitution. See
id. at 122, 335 S.E.2d at 103. By giving such short shrift to this argument, the court ignored
a substantial body of precedent to the contrary, and has created a great deal of potential
uncertainty over the ability of citizens to exercise their constitutionally protected right to
petition the government.
In Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)
and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the United States Supreme
Court fashioned what has come to be known as the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. These two
cases involved federal antitrust claims, and the Court held that liability cannot attach to the
efforts of private parties to influence government officials, even if those efforts are intended
to have an anticompetitive effect. The doctrine is grounded in the first amendment right to
petition the government, see, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-38, and is not limited to antitrust
claims. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912-15 (1982) (peaceful boycott of stores entitled to first amendment protection in action for interference with business). Numerous federal and state courts have held claims for tortious interference with
business relationships to be governed by first amendment restrictions. See, e.g., Havoco of
Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 648-51 (7th Cir. 1983); Missouri v. National Org. for
Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301, 1316-19 (8th Cir. 1980); Pennwalt Corp. v. Zenith Laboratories,
Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413, 423-24 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Protect Our Mountain Env't, Inc. v. District Court, 677 P. 2d 1361, 1365-69 (Colo. 1984); Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684-89
(Utah 1982); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 33-37 (W. Va. 1981). Although there is a limited
"sham" exception to the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, see, e.g., California Motor Transp. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972), there is no suggestion in Chaves that the
exception would apply or was considered by the court. The Chaves court's imposition of
liability for nondefamatory, nonmalicious speech by a private citizen aimed at influencing
the actions of his elected representatives may chill the ability of citizens to speak on issues
relating to government, and may also reduce the flow of information to those charged with
the responsibility for governing.
104. Chaves, 230 Va. at 118-19, 335 S.E.2d at 101-02. The supreme court also suggested
that the offending words were not capable of a defamatory meaning. See id. at 118, 335
S.E.2d at 101. The court's opinion in this regard is not entirely clear, as it talks only in
terms of the words not being defamatory per se. Id. However, if the issue were so limited,
plaintiff's case would have been permitted to proceed upon proof of special damages. See
infra text accompanying notes 216-55. There is no suggestion in the opinion that Chaves
was unable to satisfy this burden. To the contrary, since Chaves had lost a profitable contract, it seems evident that the court meant that there was simply no defamation on which
to base an action. This aspect of the opinion is consistent with existing precedent, which
recognizes that to be capable of a defamatory meaning, words must be more than just unflattering; they must, in the words of Dean Prosser, impute the "idea of disgrace." See W.
PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 739 (4th ed. 1971); see also R. SACK, supra note 3, at 45-48.
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[p]ure expressions of opinion, not amounting to "fighting words,"
cannot form the basis of an action for defamation. The First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and article 1, section 12 of
the Constitution of Virginia protect the right of the people to teach,
preach, write, or speak any such opinion, however ill-founded, without inhibition by actions for libel and slander. 10 5

Thus, for the first time, Virginia recognized an absolute privilege
to express opinion, 10 and in so doing, entered perhaps
the most
107
abstruse area of defamation law that exists today.
105. Chaves, 230 Va. at 119, 335 S.E.2d at 101-02. It is important to note that the court
chose to predicate its decision not only on the first amendment to the United States Constitution, but also on article I, section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia. This is the second
time in recent memory that the court has chosen to rely on the Virginia Constitution to
decide an issue of free speech. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.
574, 588, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922-23 (1981). In both instances, federal constitutional law was in
a state of flux, and the court employed the Virginia Constitution to eliminate the uncertainty existing at the federal level.
106. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Virginia had refused to dismiss a defamation claim on these grounds, and was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. See Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 213 Va. 377, 192 S.E.2d
737 (1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 188-215, for a more complete discussion of this
issue.
The Virginia Supreme Court's reinstatement of plaintiff Chaves' verdict on the tortious
interference count is irreconcilable with its holding that defendant's words were a constitutionally protected opinion, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. Smith, 105 S. Ct. 2787 (1985).
In McDonald, the defendant argued that an allegedly defamatory letter he sent to the
President of the United States criticizing a candidate for United States Attorney in North
Carolina was absolutely privileged under the petition clause of the first amendment. While
rejecting an absolute privilege, the Court did recognize that the defendant's activity was
entitled to constitutional protection, and held that the plaintiff would have to prove publication of a known or reckless falsity as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). See also Bagley v. Iowa Beef Processors, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1113,
1119-20 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that principles articulated in Sullivan, Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and their progeny apply to cases involving petitioning
activity).
The Virginia Supreme Court's Chaves decision runs afoul of McDonald in two respects.
First, in Chaves, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to require that the plaintiff prove
malice to recover on his tortious interference claim. Chaves, 230 Va. at 120-21, 335 S.E.2d at
102-03. McDonald clearly held that some fault requirement is necessary, strongly suggesting
that the New York Times standard must be satisfied. See McDonald, 105 S. Ct. at 2791.
While the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circut held, in Bagley, that a private figure could
recover on a showing of fault consistent with Gertz (which in Virginia would be negligence),
the court in Chaves eschewed any fault requirement.
Second, the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion that the defendant's words were opinion
should preclude any recovery on the tortious interference count, since that claim was based
on the same facts as the defamation count. A simple change of label should not abrogate the
applicability of the constitutional principles underlying McDonald. See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585, 603-04 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
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Crawford v. United Steel Workersl"' is another case in which
the words could not be categorized as factual. Crawford, which actually involved three appeals, arose out of a labor dispute. During
a protracted strike, the defendants repeatedly subjected the plaintiffs, who were considered "scabs," to a stream of insults and epithets described by the court as "disgusting, abusive, [and] repulsive."109 Plaintiff brought suit based on, among other grounds,
Virginia's insulting words statute, which provides a cause of action
for words which "from their usual construction and common acceptance are construed as insults and tend to violence and breach
of the peace."11 The circuit court sustained some of plaintiff's insulting words claims while dismissing others, and the principal issue on appeal was whether the use of such epithets in the context
of a labor dispute can serve as the basis for an action for insulting
words."'
The court was deeply divided in its decision and, as a result, the
case may not prove to be of significant precedential value. Despite
the lack of consensus, the opinion suggests some interesting
possibilities.
In a plurality opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices
Compton and Poff, the court held that any cause of action that
might exist under the insulting words statute was preempted by
federal labor laws. 12 The basis for this ruling was two United
other grounds, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983), later proceeding, 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985) (Sullivan actual malice principle applicable to claim
for tortious interference with contract when both libel and interference claims based on
same publication); cf. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986) (permitting recovery on
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on words found by jury not to be capable of a defamatory meaning, but recognizing that Sullivan principles did apply in a modified form to emotional distress claim); Friedman v. Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va.
700, 703-04, 160 S.E.2d 563, 565-66 (1968) (holding that personal injury statute of limitations applies to breach of contract claim arising from injuries suffered since it is the "object
of an action and not its form" that governs the applicable period of limitations); see supra
note 103.
108. 230 Va. 217, 335 S.E.2d 828 (1985).
109. Id. at 234, 335 S.E.2d at 839. Among the epithets employed by the various defendants were "scabby son of a bitch," "ugly-looking cocksucking bastard," "We'll get you,
mother fucker nigger," "puny scabby son of a bitch," and others of the same genre. Id. at
223-28, 335 S.E.2d at 831-35.
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-45 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
111. The Virginia Supreme Court recognized that no defamation action lies for the use of
epithets or the like, since only statements of fact can be capable of a defamatory meaning.
See Crawford, 230 Va. at 234-35, 335 S.E.2d at 838-39. See generally R. SACK, supra note 3,
at 58-62.
112. Crawford, 230 Va. at 229-35, 335 S.E.2d at 835-38.
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States Supreme Court opinions that, according to the court, prohibited such actions when they were founded on words which, although abusive, could not be viewed as stating facts."'
Justice Cochran concurred in the result, but on a different
ground. He reasoned that, since the insulting words statute has
long been completely merged with the common law cause of action
for defamation, the plaintiff's claims should have been dismissed,
because no defamatory statements of fact had been made: "An
epithet, however repulsive or intemperate, used to convey the
speaker's contempt for another, is not defamatory when it cannot
114
reasonably be understood to convey its literal meaning."
The three dissenting justices, in an opinion by Justice Russell,
took a different view. Rejecting the preemption theory," 5 they argued that the insulting words statute had not been completely
merged with common law defamation, and that where epithets are
used under circumstances tending to incite violence, they constitute "fighting words" and are thus actionable."16 What remains unclear is whether any of the justices in the plurality might subscribe
to this view when there is no issue of federal preemption, as the
plurality did not consider whether the insulting words statute has
any continued viability outside of the labor context where "fighting
117
words" are involved.
113. Id. at 234, 335 S.E.2d at 838 (citing Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers,418 U.S. 264); see also Crawford, 230 Va. at 230-31, 335 S.E.2d 835-36
(citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)).
Although the United States Supreme Court relied in part on a privilege rooted in the first
amendment, the Virginia Supreme Court did not expressly predicate its decision on the
constitutional ground.
114. Crawford, 230 Va. at 238, 335 S.E.2d at 841 (Cochran, J., concurring).
115. The dissenters in Crawford rejected the plurality's preemption theory on the basis of
Farmer v. Christian, 430 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1977) (quoting Automobile Workers v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634, 640 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)), which held that "[n]othing in the federal labor statutes protects or immunizes from state action violence or the threat of violence
in a labor dispute." Id. (emphasis added). The Crawford plurality opinion does not mention
Farmer,but notes that the plaintiffs' cases were based on "pure speech, not conduct but
speech-standing alone." Crawford, 230 Va. at 229, 335 S.E.2d at 835. The plurality opinion
thus ignores the fact that many of the offending statements in Crawford were made in a
context that strongly suggested an immediate threat of violence. See id. at 223-29, 335
S.E.2d at 831-35.
116. See id. at 238-44, 335 S.E.2d at 841-45 (Russell, J., dissenting). The United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional
protection. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
117. See infra note 241.
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Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Macione: Issues Avoided

The least significant of the five recent opinions touching on the
law of defamation, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Macione"1 8
represents the single case in which the Virginia Supreme Court
avoided a number of potentially significant issues. Although the
defendant was a newspaper publishing company, the alleged defamation was not published in a newspaper. Plaintiff Macione owned
an advertising agency that placed advertising in a Landmarkowned newspaper. The case arose when one of Landmark's advertising representatives stated in a conversation with one of Macione's clients that Macione had been "belligerent and drunk" in
one of his dealings with the company. 1 9 Macione claimed that, as
a result of these statements, his advertising agency lost business.
He proved no personal injuries, and expressly waived on appeal
any claim for humiliation or embarrassment. 20 The jury awarded
21
Macione $9,000 in compensatory damages.'
The case presented the court with a number of interesting issues, including the scope of the opinion privilege, whether the offending words were protected by a common law privilege, and
whether the words were defamatory per se. 12 2 The court addressed
none of these questions, however, instead deciding the case on the
narrow ground that any damages proved by plaintiff at trial belonged to his company and not to him personally. 23 As a result,
the opinion clears no new ground 124 and the case will be useful
only in those rare circumstances where a party is unable to prove
25
any personal injury.
118. 230 Va. 137, 334 S.E.2d 587 (1985).
119. Id. at 139, 334 S.E.2d at 588.
120. Id. at 140, 334 S.E.2d at 588-89.
121. Id.
122. See Brief for Appellant at 38-50, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Macione, 230
Va. 137, 334 S.E.2d 587 (1985) (No. 821320).
123. Landmark Communications, 230 Va. at 140, 334 S.E.2d at 588-89.
124. It is well recognized that a shareholder may not sue personally for defamatory statements directed at his corporation, and not at him personally. See generally R. SACK, supra
note 3, at 125.
125. The case should prove rare indeed where a plaintiff will be unable to show that he
was damaged personally, as mere allegations of embarrassment, humiliation, and personal
distress may be sufficient to present a jury issue under present Virginia law. See infra text
accompanying notes 216-55 for a more complete discussion of this issue. But see generally
Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984) (arguing that proof of reputational injury should be required before recovery of damages for other
emotional injuries).
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III. ISSUES THAT REMAIN
A.

The Negligence Standard: What Does It Mean?

1.

Professional Malpractice or the Ordinary Man?

Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz, the
states have struggled not only to determine what level of fault will
govern private figure defamation cases, but also to define the
framework within which to analyze the chosen standard. In private
figure defamation cases brought against a professional disseminator of news or other information of public concern,128 one important question that has arisen is whether the negligence standard of
liability is to be measured by the conduct of a reasonable journalist-thus creating a journalistic malpractice standard-or by the
actions of the ordinary man who is not in the publishing business.
While many of the courts adopting a negligence standard in private figure defamation cases have simply failed to address the issue,'1 27 a number of courts have addressed the issue, and their decisions are inconsistent.
The majority of courts considering the question have adopted a
reasonable publisher standard. 2 S Generally, these cases have relied
upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that
"[t]he defendant, if a professional disseminator of news, such as a
newspaper, a magazine or a broadcasting station, or an employee,
such as a reporter, is held to the skill and experience normally possessed by members of that profession."' 29 In following this approach, these courts have simply applied the general rule that one
126. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985) (discussing standard of liability for presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases involving
no issue of public concern); see also supra text accompanying notes 79-90.
127. See, e.g., Embers Supper Club, Inc. v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 9 Ohio St.
3d 22, -, 457 N.E.2d 1164, 1167, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239, 241-42 (Fla. 1984); Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394,
-,
649 P.2d 462, 470 (1982); McCusker v. Valley News, 121 N.H. 258, _..., 428 A.2d 493,
494, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017 (1981); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d
78, 87 (D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541
S.W.2d 809, 819-20 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 23 (1977).
128. See, e.g., Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn.
1985); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Chumley, 253 Ga. 179, -, 317 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1984);
Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, Inc., 65 Or. App. 29, _, 670 P.2d 616, 628 (1983),
afi'd, 298 Or. 434, 693 P.2d 35, cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 84 (1985); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc.,
626 P.2d 968, 976 (Utah 1981); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, _, 350 A.2d 688,
697-98 (1976); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976); Gobin v.
Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, _ 531 P.2d 76, 84 (1975).
129. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§

580B comment g, at 228 (1976).
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engaged in a profession or trade is required to exercise the level of
skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of the same
profession in similar communities.13 0 Thus, once a court adopts
negligence as the standard that will govern private figure defamation cases, defining that standard as journalistic malpractice clears
no new ground and, indeed, is the approach most consistent with
3
widely recognized principles of tort law.' '
Notwithstanding the apparent consistency of a journalistic malpractice standard with the common law of torts, a few courts have
rejected any notion that the media should be judged on the basis
of professional standards, and instead, have opted for a reasonable
person standard. 3 2 The justification for this approach was best
stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which worried that
[t]he problem with such an approach [journalistic malpractice] is
that it would make the prevailing newspaper practices in a community controlling. In a community having only a single newspaper, the
approach suggested would permit that paper to establish its own
standards. And in any community, it might tend, in "Gresham's
law" fashion, toward a progressive depreciation of the standard of
care.

133

This concern about letting the proverbial fox loose in the hen
house is flawed, because it misunderstands the nature of a reasonable publisher standard, where the defendant's conduct is not
judged by the standards in the community of publication, but
rather, by the standards in "similar communities.' 13 4 Moreover, as
130. See, e.g., id. § 299A (1965).
131. An analysis based on professional standards is not without its problems. As Professor
Anderson points out, journalists frequently disagree over what constitutes "reasonable"
journalism. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 455-56
(1975).
132. See Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 65 Haw. 584, -,
656 P.2d 79, 82 (1982);
Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, -,
437 N.E.2d 205, 214-15 (1982); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn. 1978); Troman v. Wood, 62 IMI.2d 184,
-,
340 N.E.2d 292, 298 (1975). In McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623
S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982), the Supreme Court of Kentucky
stated that the negligence standard articulated by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Nichols
"is a reasonable one." McCall, 623 S.W.2d at 886. The court did not say whether it was
adopting that portion of Nichols discussing whether a reasonable publisher or ordinary man
standard should apply, although it is certainly reasonable to interpret the court's opinion as
adopting the Tennessee approach in its entirety.
133. Troman, 62 IMI.2d at -,
340 N.E.2d at 298-99.
134. Gobin, 216 Kan. at -,
531 P.2d at 84; see, e.g., Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 976; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1976). Indeed, in Bank of Oregon, the
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the Restatement explains, although custom is important in judging
whether a publisher was negligent, it is not necessarily controlling. 35 Thus, a single publisher could not, as the Illinois court suggested, control the degree of care due by adopting substandard
practices.
By refusing to judge a professional publisher's conduct on the
basis of those similarly situated, courts rejecting the Restatement's
approach set up an unrealistic framework within which a defamation is to be judged. It simply makes no sense to determine
whether a newspaper was reasonable in researching, writing, and
publishing a complex story investigating the toxic waste disposal
practices of the chemical industry by asking whether that newspaper lived up to the standards of some hypothetical reasonable person, who is not generally engaged in researching, writing, or publishing any news stories, much less stories of great complexity.
Arguably recognizing this fact, the United States Supreme Court
was careful to limit its holding in Gertz, which paved the way for a
negligence standard, to circumstances that would alert "a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster" to defamatory potential. 13 6 In
doing so, the Court seems to have accepted as the appropriate
frame of reference a standard that looks to the publisher's professional standards, and the cases rejecting such an approach may be
court expressly refused to adopt a "locality" rule, opting instead to treat the evidence of
practices in a particular community "as merely one factor to be taken into account in applying the general professional standard." Bank of Oregon, 65 Or. App. at -, 670 P.2d at 62829.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1976). Underlying the debate
over whether professional or ordinary negligence should govern defamation cases against the
press is a disagreement over the proper role of expert testimony in such cases. While virtually all cases recognize the admissibility in appropriate cases of testimony on the standards
of professional journalism, some courts have suggested that, with a reasonable publisher
standard, expert testimony is controlling, and a plaintiff's failure to produce expert testi656 P.2d at 82-83; Schrottman, 386
mony is necessarily fatal. See Kohn, 65 Haw. at -,
437 N.E.2d at 214. The fear of such a rigid rule appears unfounded. Those
Mass. at -,
courts adopting a reasonable publisher standard have recognized only that expert testimony
may, in an appropriate case, be controlling, and not that it is automatically dispositive. See,
670 P.2d at 628-29; Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 976.
e.g., Bank of Oregon, 65 Or. App. at -,
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1976) (explaining that
while courts should be reluctant to send a case to the jury in the absence of any showing
that professional standards were violated, custom is not necessarily controlling).
Thus, while expert testimony might control in a case involving a detailed and complex
example of investigative journalism, it would generally not be dispositive in a case involving,
for example, a simple failure to report correctly the contents of a trial transcript, as occurred in one of the Harris cases. See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 30, 325 S.E.2d 713,
734 (1985).
136. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
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incompatible with this governing precedent.
In Harris,the Virginia Supreme Court joined those jurisdictions
that have failed to face this issue squarely, although the opinion
does contain a few clues strongly suggesting that Virginia will apply a reasonable publisher standard. First, although the court did
not explicitly adopt the Restatement approach, it relied on the Restatement to support its choice of negligence as the applicable
standard.13 7 Moreover, the language used in Harristo describe the
negligence standard very closely tracks that found in the relevant
138
section of the Restatement.
Second, perhaps more than any other court,139 the Virginia Supreme Court emphasized, in accordance with Gertz, that application of the negligence standard is limited to circumstances where a
"reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster"'14 0 would be warned of
a publication's defamatory potential. 4 ' Thus, in a closely related
context, the court has employed as its frame of reference a professional standard of care.
Finally, in discussing the conduct of the various newspaper defendants in Harris,the court seemed to focus on the journalistic
reasonableness of the actions taken. 142 For example, in the Port
Packet case, the court ruled that "an editor, who was exercising
reasonable care" should have been alerted to the harmful potential
of the article sued upon. 43 Together, these factors strongly suggest
that Virginia will properly measure negligence in defamation cases
against the press by the standards of professional disseminators of
news.
2.

The Problem of Predictability

Whatever form it takes-journalistic malpractice or the ordinary
man-the negligence standard has been criticized in the context of
defamation because of a perceived lack of predictability in its application, and many fear that it will not adequately protect a publisher from the undue imposition of liability. Perhaps the most
137. See Harris, 229 Va. at 17, 325 S.E.2d at 726.

138. Compare id. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 724-25 with
580B.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See infra text accompanying notes 167-86.
Harris, 229 Va. at 11, 325 S.E.2d at 722.
See id. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 724-25.
See id. at 22-24, 325 S.E.2d at 729-31.
Id. at 39-40, 325 S.E.2d at 739-40.
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concise statement of this problem was provided by Professor Anderson in his seminal article on negligence in defamation cases:
[F]ew would deny that negligence in the physical torts represents a
very flexible mechanism for obtaining the judgment of both judge
and jury on a specific fact situation. But negligence under Gertz
serves an entirely different purpose-the preservation of a minimum
area of "breathing space" for the press-which it attempts to accomplish by freeing publishers and broadcasters from liability for
innocent misstatements. Gertz envisions a regime in which publishers who exercise reasonable care need not fear libel judgments, but
the hope that this will prevent unnecessary self-censorship is illusory. No one with the slightest appreciation for the myriad uncerthe belief that reatainties of common law negligence would rely on
144
sonable care will preclude an adverse verdict. '
The concerns expressed by Professor Anderson and other commentators'4 5 appear also to be supported by much of the case
law1 46 that has developed since the United States Supreme Court
set negligence as the minimum degree of fault that would satisfy
constitutional requirements.' 4 7 One example of this problem can be
seen in a comparison of the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in
Firestone v. Time, Inc.,4 5 with the opinion of Florida's intermediate court of appeals in the same case. 49 The intermediate court
was impressed with Time Magazine's efforts to ensure accuracy:
"There were checks and double checks, quite extensive in scope
considering the obvious press of time forced by journalistic deadlines. Nowhere was there proof Time was even negligent.' 5 0 Reviewing the same record, the Florida Supreme Court opined that
144. Anderson, supra note 131, at 460. In his dissent in Harris, Justice Harrison made
essentially the same point. See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 53-54, 325 S.E.2d 713, 748-

49 (1985).
145. See, e.g., Franklin, What Does "Negligence" Mean in Defamation Cases?, 6 COMM
ENr. L.J. 259 (1984). But see, e.g., Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In

Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TFx L. REv. 199 (1976).
146. An excellent review of how lower courts have interpreted the negligence standard in
defamation cases is set forth in Franklin, supra note 145.
147. Gertz did not require the adoption of any particular level of fault. Rather, the Court
simply held that imposition of liability without fault in defamation cases was impermissible.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
148. 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), cert. granted,421 U.S. 909 (1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 448
(1976). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not a public
figure. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976).

149. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
150. Id. at 389-90.
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"this erroneous reporting is clear and convincing evidence of the
negligence in certain segments of the news media in gathering the
15
news." 1
The question thus arises: will foreseeable results from application of the negligence standard in Virginia defamation cases be as
unpredictable as has apparently been the case in other jurisdictions, or will a greater degree of certainty prevail? Unfortunately, a
careful review of Harris suggests the former.
Of the four cases before the court, only the decision involving
The Gazette contained an explicit discussion of what facts must be
present in order to establish negligence, although the Court's discussion of the conduct of The Daily Progress and The Port Packet
may also provide some insight into the new standard. In the Harris
case, the court found a number of the newspaper's actions to have
been potentially negligent. First, the reporter admitted to not understanding the explanatory headings at the top of each page of
the docket book, which the court perceived to be necessary for a
complete understanding of the public record. Thus "[t]he jury was
entitled to conclude that the reporter was negligent because of his
ignorance.' 1 52 Second, the omission of the explanatory headings
from the newspaper report was held to constitute evidence of negligence;,5' This conclusion was buttressed by the reporter's testimony that the story "looked like an error," by the editor's testimony that the item was "not unclear," and by the testimony of the
publisher who, when asked if he understood what the article
meant, answered, "I think I do.' 4 Finally, the court found that
never before in reporting on a public record like this had the newspaper named the complaining witnesses, and "the jury was entitled
to determine whether, in reporting crimes of this magnitude, the
long standing custom of The Gazette should have been violated."1 5' The court's analysis of The Gazette's action is essentially
151. Firestone, 305 So. 2d at 178. Compare Wihon v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393
(La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 320 So. 2d 203 (1975) with Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc., 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
152. Harris, 229 Va. at 29, 325 S.E.2d at 730.

153. Id.
154. Id. at 24, 325 S.E.2d at 731.
155. Id. at 24-25, 325 S.E.2d at 731. In this respect, the court's analysis seems an undue
intrusion into the editorial process, and ignores widely accepted first amendment doctrine,
which recognizes that "[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to [the] . . . content of the paper ... constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); see, e.g.,
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
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unremarkable, and is generally consistent with the developing case
law on the subject. 156 More troubling is its discussion of the Daily
Progress and Port Packet cases.
The Daily Progresshad not argued at trial that there was insufficient evidence of negligence. Nevertheless, in its discussion of
qualified privilege to report on court proceedings, the court discussed certain facts which it suggested were relevant to the negligence issue. They included the lack of experience and training possessed by the reporter, reliance on a preliminary hearing transcript
without knowing whether the same testimony was presented at
trial, failure to interview any of the trial participants, and testimony by the reporter that use of the erroneous courtesy title was
"just a slip of my memory. ' 1 7 While there is no question that
these factors may, in an appropriate case, be considered in the
fault equation, 158 the court entirely ignored the powerful argument
that, notwithstanding evidence of an unreasonable mistake by the
reporter, the plaintiff could prove no causal link between her al159
leged injuries and the mistake.
In the Daily Progresscase, the plaintiff was the complaining witness in a rape case that resulted in the defendant's conviction for
fornication. The necessary implication of such a finding by the jury
was that the plaintiff also was guilty of fornication, which was precisely the implication that she claimed arose when the fact of her
pregnancy was combined with the use of the mistaken courtesy title of "Miss." In other words, even if the newspaper had reported
the courtesy title correctly, the story would still have carried the
implication that she had committed an act of fornication, and the
injury would be the same.1 60
In the Port Packet case, the court failed to explain why it found
156. See generally B. SANFORD, supra note 3, § 8.4.
157. Harris, 229 Va. at 30, 325 S.E.2d at 734.
158. However, with the exception of the reporter's apparent faulty memory, the factors
discussed by the court would seem to have little to do with causing the mistake sued on, as
the correct information was admittedly before the reporter.
159. To establish liability, a defendant's negligence must, of course, be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Farren v. Gilbert, 224 Va. 407, 297 S.E.2d 668
(1982); Roll 'R' Way Rinks, Inc. v. Smith, 218 Va. 321, 237 S.E.2d 157 (1977).
160. Indeed, had the newspaper reported that plaintiff was married, the arguably more
serious implication that she was guilty of adultery would have arisen, since the defendant
convicted of the crime was not plaintiff's husband. At common law, even though words are
capable of defamatory meaning, they are not actionable if their gist or sting is no worse than
the truth. See, e.g., Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc., 609 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Okla. 1977), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980); Gomba v. McLaughlin, 180 Colo. 232, 504 P.2d 337 (1973).
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the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence,
but did discuss why there was insufficient evidence to support a
finding of publication with reckless disregard for the truth, which
had been necessary to support the award of punitive damages.
While the concepts of reckless disregard and negligence are quite
different, the court, in finding no recklessness, emphasized that the
story had been "researched in depth" and "edited in a deliberate
fashion with consideration given to accuracy."''1 One might think
that, by following such procedures, the publisher of important
news would be protected even under a negligence standard. The
court's failure to explain more fully its reasoning is unfortunate.
Two other aspects of Harris suggest further that negligence in
Virginia will be a slippery doctrine indeed. In his article on defamation and the negligence standard, Professor Anderson suggested
that certain procedural devices might be used to alleviate at least
some of the problems of uncertainty surrounding negligence. These
include a requirement that negligence be shown by clear and convincing evidence, and that appellate courts exercise independent
review of jury verdicts finding that a defendant was at fault." 2
Both of these requirements apply in cases where the plaintiff must
prove New York Times malice to prevail," 3 and although the court
in Harris considered both possibilities, it declined to follow either.
The court held that negligence need be proved only by a "preponderance of the evidence,"' 6 4 and then reasoned that since "[tihe
negligence standard for compensatory damages that we have
adopted is not a matter of governing federal constitutional law,"
the standard of review set forth in section 8.01-680 of the Virginia
Code-requiring that a judgment be "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it"-would govern such cases." 5 Thus, the uncer161. Harris, 229 Va. at 42, 325 S.E.2d at 741.
162. Anderson, supra note 131, at 467-68.
163. New York Times malice must be proved where plaintiff is a public official or public
figure or when punitive damages are sought. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334-36.
164. Harris, 229 Va. at 15, 325 S.E.2d at 725.
165. Id. at 20, 325 S.E.2d at 728. The court's conclusion that proof of negligence does not
raise a question of constitutional dimension is unsound. Gertz clearly held that negligence,
as a minimum level of fault, is constitutionally required. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-48; see also
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1985) (holding that placement of
burden of proving falsity on plaintiff is constitutionally required). See generally R. SACK,
supra note 3, at 207. Indeed, had negligence not been a constitutional requirement, the

United States Supreme Court simply would have been without jurisdiction to require that
Virginia change its common law rule, as no federal question would have been presented. See
generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 12-19 (2d ed. 1973).
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tainty generally associated with a negligence standard is likely to
be exacerbated by the absence of any meaningful procedural safeguards to ensure consistent results. 6
3.

Limitations on the Application of the Negligence Standard

Although adopting a negligence standard, the court in Harris
placed what may be an important limitation on its use:
The application of this negligence standard is expressly limited,
however, to circumstances where the defamatory statement makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent. The trial judge shall
make such determination as a matter of law. If, on the other hand,
no substantial danger to reputation is apparent from the statement
in issue, New York Times malice must be established to recover
compensatory damages. 167
The inquiry to be made by the trial court was likened to the inquiry traditionally made on the question whether a statement is
libelous per se.' e5 The trial judge is to decide, "viewing the circumstances objectively, whether a reasonable and prudent editor
should have anticipated that the words used contained an imputation necessarily harmful to reputation." 169
The limitation is based on Gertz, where the United States Supreme Court suggested that private figures who sue for defamation
might be subject to the more exacting proof requirements when a
publication on its face does not alert a reasonably prudent editor
of its defamatory potential.17 0 The Virginia Supreme Court was
correct when it noted that this limitation "has not been sufficiently
emphasized in many of the decisions and comments based on
Gertz"; L7 1 only a few reported decisions have even mentioned that
such a limitation might obtain,17 2 and even fewer have actually dis166. Further supporting the conclusion is a study by the Libel Defense Resource Center
which did not find any cases "tried to a negligence standard in which a verdict or judgment
for the plaintiff was reversed based exclusively upon an appellate ruling that the finding of
negligence was erroneous." Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin, No. 6 at 35, 42 (1983).
167. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 15, 325 S.E. 2d. 713, 725 (1985).
168. Id. at 22, 325 S.E.2d at 729.
169. Id. at 22-23, 325 S.E.2d at 729.
170. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
171. Harris, 229 Va. at 11, 325 S.E.2d at 722.
172. See, e.g., Sobel v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2462, 2465 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1980), afl'd, 395 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, _, 391 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1060 (1980);
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missed a case on that basis.17 3

Although, in the three newspaper cases before the court in Harris, there was substantial doubt as to whether those responsible for
publication actually appreciated the potentially defamatory content of the stories, the standard by which the limitation is to be
judged is objective, not subjective, and the court had little difficulty requiring that the defendants exercise the reasonable care required by a negligence standard. Thus, in the case involving The
Daily Progress,the court explained that "[m]anifestly, the content
of a news item which states that an unmarried woman is pregnant
creates a substantial danger to reputation and should warn a reasonably prudent editor of the item's defamatory potential.

17

4

Sim-

ilarly, in The Goochland Gazette's case, the court declined to apply the limitation because it felt that the publication was so
misleading that "[a] reader would probably conclude from the arrangement of the language that the plaintiffs were charged with
crimes.

' 17 5

Although the court did not say so, it was obviously in-

fluenced by the fact that all of the articles at issue involved allegations of criminal conduct, a subject with obvious defamatory
potential.
When then does the limitation apply? Two potential circumstances readily come to mind. First, there are those cases in which
the defamatory potential of the offending words is not discernible
from the face of the publication, but appears only when considered
in light of extrinsic facts. Unlike Virginia, most jurisdictions have
historically distinguished between libels that on their face are defamatory and those that become defamatory only when viewed in
juxtaposition with certain extrinsic facts not contained in the publication. 7 ' The latter kind of libels, which are generally referred to
as libel per quod, do not appear on their face to have defamatory
meaning. In recognition of the reduced likelihood of injury by the
publication of libels per quod, they were actionable at common law
only upon proof of actual pecuniary loss. 17 7 Until Harris was de-

cided, the distinction was not relevant in Virginia, where the
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 233, 531 P.2d 76, 84 (1975); Troman v. Wood,
62 Ill. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975).
173. See Sobel, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2465; Cefalu, 8 Mass. App. Ct. at -,
391

N.E.2d at 938.
174. Harris, 229 Va. at 28-29, 325 S.E.2d at 733.

175. Id. at 23, 325 S.E.2d at 730 (emphasis added).
176. See infra note 245.
177. See generally R. SACK, supra note 3, at 94-100.
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courts considered only the subject matter of the offending words
and determined the extent to which they were actionable based on
their content rather than on the obviousness of their defamatory
potential.17 8 However, the limitation expressed in Harris would

certainly appear to encompass the traditional concept of libel per
quod as recognized by most other jurisdictions, and in such cases
17 9
would require proof of New York Times malice.

The limitation fashioned by the Virginia Supreme Court in Harris appears also to be directed at a second form of defamatory publication which, although arguably defamatory on its face, is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for reasonable nondefamatory
interpretations as well. The court emphasized that the higher burden of proof-New York Times malice-would apply in a case
where "[t]he publication was .

.

. merely confusing, unclear, and

garbled (conditions which ordinarily would not create defamatory
potential)."1 80 While it is unclear precisely what the court means
by this statement, it is likely referring to situations where an ambiguity in wording, tone, or the like subjects a statement to more
than one interpretation. While, at common law, such a publication
was actionable (as plaintiff was entitled to argue that it was understood in its defamatory sense),"8" after Harris,that plaintiff may
also have to prove publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.
One possible example of this kind of case is Cefalu v. Globe
Newspaper Co.,'182 where the Massachusetts intermediate appeals

court dismissed a libel action on the grounds that the content of
the publication did not sufficiently make the danger to reputation
apparent. The case arose out of the publication of a series of articles on the Massachusetts economy. One such article was illustrated with a photograph of a group of individuals standing in lines
at the unemployment office with the caption, "A few of the 185,000
persons out of work in Massachusetts line up at the unemployment
office at the Hurley Building in Government Center."' 83 The plaintiff, one of those pictured, was not unemployed and claimed that
178. See supra note 76.
179. See Sobel, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2465 (dismissing case in part on grounds that
offending words were libel per quod and plaintiff could not prove New York Times malice).
180. Harris, 229 Va. at 23, 325 S.E.2d at 730.
181. See generally R. SACK, supra note 3, at 72-73.

182. 8 Mass. App. Ct. at
183. Id. at -,

-,

391 N.E.2d at 935.

391 N.E.2d at 936.
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the implication that he was out of work defamed him. In dismissing the case, the court explained that "there was no reason for
an editor to suppose that the persons lined up at a desk to receive
unemployment payments were there for any purpose other than
184
'
that which one might expect would place them at such a scene.

In addition to this kind of case, it is not hard to imagine other
candidates for application of the expressed limitation fashioned in
Harris. Consider, for example, a slightly modified illustration provided by the Restatement: "A [writes] in a newspaper that B, a
[doctor], . . . recommends to her patients the use of a certain

brand of whiskey for medicinal purposes. If a substantial number
of respectable persons in the community regard this use of whiskey
as discreditable, A has defamed B."' 5 But, may B recover on a
showing of mere negligence? The answer probably depends on the
context in which the statement appears. 8 ' If the article as a whole
praises the revolutionary medical techniques of Doctor B, the court
should require proof of recklessness, because the subject of the
story would probably not alert most to the defamatory potential.
On the other hand, if the subject of the story is quackery, a different result should obtain. The impact of this limitation on the negligence standard will become evident only upon future decisions,
but in reading Gertz as carefully as it did, the court has put itself
on the cutting edge of one aspect of the developing law of
defamation.
B.

The Opinion Conundrum

"When you read the cases, they are a mess." So said Judge
Harry T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit during an en banc oral argument of a
1984 libel case considering the actionability of opinions.18 7 Judge
Edwards is not alone in his view. Both courts and commentators
alike have consistently bemoaned the state of defamation law regarding opinion. 185
The black letter rule of law applicable to statements of opinion
184. Id. at -,
391 N.E.2d at 938.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment e, illustration 1 (1976).

186. Context is often the critical factor in assessing the defamatory potential of a publication. See generally R. SACK, supra note 3, at 82.
187. Judge Edwards is quoted in B. SANFORD, supra note 3, at 104.
188. See, e.g., R. SACK, supra note 3, at 155-56; PROSSER, supra note 104, at 820.
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is easily stated: Under the first amendment, opinions may not
serve as the basis for a defamation claim; the target of criticism
that is characterized as opinion may not maintain an action no
matter how vituperative or unjustified the comment may be.' 89
Moreover, it is now clear that the determination of whether words
constitute opinion presents a question of law. 9 0 However, once one
moves beyond simple black letter statements, clarity rapidly vanishes; defining what actually constitutes an opinion can be an extremely diffficult and uncertain task. 191
Broadly categorized, one can discern four different views taken
by the courts in defining what constitutes protected opinion. Some
courts have taken what is best described as a result-oriented approach. Their decisions either provide no meaningful explanation
of the courts' rationale," 2 or appear to eschew any consistent doctrine in favor of reaching a desired end.19 3 Such an approach is
probably the least desirable because of its obvious lack of predictability, a factor of particular importance in defamation cases.'
189. See, e.g., Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
960 (1979); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397
N.Y.S.2d 943, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). The opinion privilege has generally been
said to arise from dicta in Gertz where Justice Powell stated: "Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). In the same term, the Court
relied on this language to dismiss a defamation claim founded on a series of epithets because "[s]uch words were obviously used here in a loose, figurative sense." Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974). The
existence of a privilege for opinion had been suggested four years before in Greenbelt Coop.
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), when the Court dismissed a libel action on
the grounds that the offending words constituted rhetorical hyperbole. See generally B.
SANFORD, supra note 3, at 107-58.
190. See, e.g., Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 119, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985).
191. "No task undertaken under the law of defamation is any more elusive than distinguishing between ...
[fact and opinion]." R. SACK, supra note 3, at 155.
192. See, e.g., Shiver v. Appalachee Publishing Co., 425 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); A Shop Called East, Inc. v. KYW-Channel 3, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1399 (D.N.J.
1982). See generally B. SANFORD, supra note 3, at 121-22.
193. These cases generally involve publications implying some form of criminal conduct.
See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); Rinaldi, 42
N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943. See generally B. SANFORD, supra note 3, at
122.
194. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The rationale for extending
constitutional protection to false defamatory speech, which the Supreme Court has recognized to have no constitutional value, is that a degree of breathing space is necessary to
ensure that protected expression is not chilled by the fear of a lawsuit. See, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974). In order for such a policy to be effective, a
publisher, before publication, must be able to predict, with a reasonable degree of certainty,
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A second group of cases focuses on whether the offending words
are capable of objective verification. If they are not, the opinion
privilege will be held to apply. 195 One noted expert has gone so far
as to argue that verifiability vel non should be the exclusive test
for determining whether absolute first amendment protection will
obtain.19 s The principal drawback of this approach is that it focuses the court's inquiry on the wrong question. As the Virginia
Supreme Court recognized in Chaves, opinions are protected, not
because they are right or wrong, but rather because they will not
be understood by the reader in the same sense as disparaging
statements of fact.19 7 Opinions exist to be disagreed with and do
not, so the courts have reasoned, have the same potential to injure
reputation as do statements of fact."9 " The problem with asking
the wrong question, as does an approach that looks solely to the
objective verifiability of the words, is that some statements that
will be understood by the reader to be opinion-and should accordingly be protected-may in fact be capable of some objective
verification.1 9
The third and fourth approaches taken by some courts are quite
similar, but have one important difference worth emphasizing.
Under both approaches, courts determine whether a statement is
opinion or fact by considering the totality of the circumstances." 0
whether the statements are actionable. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc.,
627 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
195. See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
196. Franklin, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 825, 865-87 (1984).

197. See Chaves, 230 Va. at 119, 335 S.E.2d at 101-02.
198. In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson explained: "[E]rror of opinion may
be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Id. at 119, 335 S.E.2d at 102; see also
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 n.8.
199. For example, a bald statement by A that his neighbor is an alcoholic clearly ought
not to be protected, because most readers would understand it to be a statement of fact. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c, illustration 3 (1976). However, according to the Restatement, the following should be protected:
A writes to B about his neighbor C: 'He moved in six months ago. He works downtown, and I have seen him during that time only twice, in his backyard around 5:30
seated in a deck chair with a portable radio listening to a news broadcast, and with a
drink in his hand. I think he must be an alcoholic.'
Id. § 566 comment c, illustration 4. This second example clearly should constitute opinion,
because the reader is left to draw his or her own conclusion. Under a test that looks only at
the verifiability of the words, this example is also arguably subject to objective proof.
200. See, e.g., Olman, 750 F.2d at 979; Information Control Corp. v. Genesis I Computer
Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1980); Cole v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 386 Mass.
303, -, 435 N.E.2d 1021, 1025, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982).
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However, only the third approach, which is championed by the Restatement, 0 1 distinguishes between pure and mixed opinion. °2
Pure opinion is absolutely protected by the first amendment, while
mixed opinion is not. As explained in the Restatement, an opinion
facts and implies the exisis "mixed" if it is based on undisclosed
20 3
tence of unstated defamatory facts.
The principal drawback of this third approach is that the task of
discerning what facts may be implied from an opinion is often
more difficult than defining opinion itself. Strained attempts by
courts to divine undefined factual implications often lead to results
that seem explainable only by a court's apparent desire to reach a
particular result, 04 and not by any consistent application of first
amendment doctrine. Thus, like the first approach, predictability-the touchstone of any effective rule of defamation aw2 05--is
sacrificed, and first amendment rights are unavoidably chilled.
Criticism of the third approach is not meant to suggest that the
factual implications of an opinion should have no bearing. On the
contrary, they may be of critical importanfce in determining what
degree of constitutional protection should apply. The vice in the
Restatement's approach lies not in its objective, but rather in its
application; it tends to emphasize one factor to the exclusion of
others.
This pitfall was avoided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in what may prove to be a
landmark decision. In Olman v. Evans20 the court attempted to
set forth a coherent and comprehensive doctrine governing the law
of opinion. The decision has great promise in the development of a
§ 566.
202. See, e.g., Orr, 586 F.2d 1108; Washburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977).
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORT

203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment b.

204. See, e.g., Searer v. Wometco W. Michigan TV, Inc., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1639
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1981) (comment that "[plaintiff] went down and started Channel 41... and
then he didn't make it down there, I guess, whatever happened, and then-he went away for a
while," implied unstated defamatory facts regarding plaintiff's competence); Maule v. NYM
Corp., 76 A.D.2d 58, 429 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 54-N.Y.2d 880, 429
N.E.2d 416, 444 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1981) (comment by defendant that plaintiff, a writer for
Sports Illustrated,was not a "graceful wordman" and was quite possibly the "worst writer"
at the magazine implied defamatory facts).
205. See supra note 194.
206. 750 F.2d 970. The second and eighth circuits have also adopted the approach articulated in Judge Starr's majority opinion in Olman. See Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste. Jour
Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1986); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.
1986) (also adopting portions of Judge Bork's concurring opinion).
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consistent and reasonably predictable set of rules, and many elements of the approach taken in that case can be seen in the Virginia Supreme Court's recent opinion in Chaves.
The analysis in OIlman is focused on the impression that the
offending statement will have on the average reader. °7 To determine whether that reader will be likely to view the words used as
fact or opinion, the Olman court identified four factors that
should be considered: (1) the common usage and meaning of the
specific language employed; 208 (2) the statement's objective verifiability;" 9 (3) the context surrounding- the statement;21 0 and (4)
2 11
the broader social context in which the words were uttered.
Although the Virginia Supreme Court in Chaves did not attempt
to set forth a comprehensive doctrine that will govern the opinion
privilege, it appears to have eschewed any overly rigid or dogmatic
approach in favor of an analysis that takes into account the totality of the circumstances in each case. In holding that a statement
made by one architect that a competitor was inexperienced and
charged excessive fees was opinion, the court first emphasized the
"relative" nature of such statements; according to the court, their
impact was largely dependent on the speaker's "viewpoint. '2 12 Implicit in this aspect of the decision is a consideration of both the
precise words used and the related issue of their objective verifiability. The court continued by emphasizing that the relative nature of the statements would be "obvious to anyone who hears
them," pointing out in particular that the competitive relationship
207. The court emphasized that it is the average reader's view that is important, not what
the "most skeptical or most incredulous reader" might think. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979 n.16.
208. Id. at 979-81. For example, statements that are only "loosely definable" or "variously
interpretable" are, in most cases, opinion, while accusations of criminal conduct are generally so "laden with factual content" that they will be actionable. Id. at 980.
209. Id. at 979, 981-82. "[A] reader cannot rationally view an unverifiable statement as
conveying ... facts." Id. at 981. Moreover, many value judgments, such as accusations of
fascism or the like are not verifiable objectively and, if liability may attach on such a basis,
"the trier of fact may improperly tend to render a decision based upon the approval or
disapproval of the contents of the statement, its author, or its subject." Id.
210. Id. at 979, 982-83. Important to this consideration is the use of "cautionary language." Id. at 982. In addition, where potentially factual statements are used in a "metaphorical, exaggerated, or even fantastic sense," they are not actionable. Id. For example, in
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, 398 U.S. at 6, the United States Supreme Court held
that an accusation of blackmail against a real estate developer was only rhetorical hyperbole

suggesting unreasonable bargaining tactics, under the circumstances.
211. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979, 983-84. For example, words such as traitor, when used in a
labor dispute, often cannot be taken literally. See id. at 983.
212. Chaves, 230 Va. at 118-19, 335 S.E.2d at 101.
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between the speaker and his target further supported this conclusion. 213 Thus, the court considered the context in which the statements were made, focusing on the effect that the statements would
have on their recipient.
An additional aspect of the court's opinion in Chaves suggests
that it may follow a flexible Ollman-like approach to questions involving the opinion privilege. Although the court does not explicitly say so, the structure of the decision at least hints that the
court may not favor the Restatement view. While the portion of
the opinion relating to defamation does not mention the Restatement, the court drew heavily on the Restatement in the second
half of its opinion, which discusses the plaintiff's claim for tortious
interference with contractual relationship. 14 Moreover, in Harris
the court accepted the Restatement's analysis of other aspects of
defamation law.215 Thus, it is at least reasonable to suggest that
the absence of any mention of the Restatement in the court's discussion of the opinion privilege may have significance.
C.

What Remains of Special Damages?

A remaining area of uncertainty in Virginia defamation law revolves around the kind of damage that must be proved to support
an action on words that are not defamatory per se. Based on two
short sentences in Fleming I, which were repeated in Harris,2 16 one
can now argue that the Virginia Supreme Court has washed away
more than 200 years of defamation law and effected a radical
change in the type of damages that will support a claim involving a
non-per se defamation.
The issue arose in Fleming I when the court was presented with
the question of whether an accusation that the plaintiff, Bedford
Moore, was a racist was defamatory per se.217 If it were not defamatory per se, as the defendant James Fleming contended, the common law of Virginia required that Moore first prove special damages,2 18 a burden that Fleming maintained he could not satisfy.
213. Id. at 119, 335 S.E.2d at 101.
214. See id. at 120-21, 335 S.E.2d at 102-03.
215. See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 17, 37, 325 S.E.2d 713, 726, 738 (1985).
216. See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 13, 325 S.E.2d 713, 723 (1985).
217. The categories of words actionable per se are set forth supra note 76.
218. On the other hand, if words constituted a per se defamation, damage was presumed,
and the plaintiff could recover without any proof of injury. See Great Coastal Express, Inc.
v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 149-51, 334 S.E.2d 846, 851 (1985). In Gertz the Supreme Court

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:3

Before Fleming 1, the accepted rule was that special damages consisted of actual pecuniary loss suffered as a direct result of the offending publication.2 19
After reviewing the categories of words that constitute a per se
defamation, the court in Fleming I concluded that the accusation
leveled against Moore did not fall into one of the recognized categories. Since Moore had not proved any pecuniary loss, one might
logically have expected, based on past precedent, that his action
would have been dismissed. This was not the case, however, as the
court radically altered the meaning of the phrase "special damages" by writing:
"Special Damages", which under the common law rule must be
shown as a prerequisite to recovery where the defamatory words are
not actionable per se, are not to be limited to pecuniary loss. To the
extent that language in Shupe may be construed to indicate that
emotional upset and embarrassment cannot constitute "special damages," it is hereby modified. 2 0
Although Moore had failed to prove pecuniary loss, he had shown
emotional upset, and his action was thus allowed to proceed on
that basis.2 21
Given the brevity of the court's discussion of this issue and the
absence of any explanation of why such a radical change was being
effected, one must question whether this result was really intended, or was caused by a misunderstanding of the true nature of
special damages. A careful analysis of the historical underpinnings
of the requirement that special damages be proved, the structure
of the court's opinions in Fleming I and Harris,and recent interheld that presumed damages are unconstitutional unless the plaintiff proves publication of a
knowing or reckless falsity. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). However,
in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985), the Court limited Gertz
to publications involving matters of public concern. More recently, in Great Coastal, the
Virginia Supreme Court recognized the continuing viability of the presumed damages doctrine where the offending words do not involve a matter of public concern. See supra text
accompanying notes 79-90.
219. See Shupe v. Rose's Stores, 213 Va. 374, 376, 192 S.E.2d 766, 767 (1972). See generally S. METcALF, RIGHTS AND LIAmLrrIs OF PUBLISHERS, BROADCASTERS AND REPORTERS
§ 1.13, at 1-39 (1985).
220. Fleming I, 221 Va. 884, 894, 275 S.E.2d 632, 639 (1981).
221. At common law, once special damages were proved the plaintiff could recover general
damages, which included emotional distress and embarrassment, among other things. See
generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KER'TON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 112, at 793-95 (5th ed. 1984).
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pretations of the requirement, suggest that the latter may in fact
be the case.
A historical review of the requirement that special damages be
proved where words are not defamatory per se illustrates how dramatic a change is effected by a literal interpretation of the court's
opinion in Fleming I, and its reiteration in Harris. The modern
law of defamation in Virginia has its origin in three distinct forms
of action for disparaging words. First, there was the action for slander, involving spoken words, which the common law courts initially
accepted as an action on the case.22 2 Damage, not insult, was the
gist of the action. 223 During the first half of the seventeenth century, the common law judges relaxed the requirement that pecuniary loss be alleged and proved in all cases of slander, recognizing
that certain words carried with them imputations that presumptively would cause such damage. These words were actionable per
se.224 Thus, actions were permitted on words charging commission
of certain crimes, words charging infection with certain diseases,
words imputing unfitness to perform the duties of an office of employment for profit, and words prejudicing a person in his profession or trade.2 25 Unless words fell into one of the categories that
were actionable per se, slander remained an action on the case requiring proof that the defamatory imputation in fact had caused
226
specific pecuniary loss.
Unlike slander, the rules applicable to libel, that is, written defamation, originated in the Court of Star Chamber, which was concerned with maintaining the peace.2 27 Since dueling was a practice
that endangered the peace, Star Chamber entertained certain private defamation actions to provide redress for insults.2 28 While
truth was a defense in action for slander, "because a person ought
not to be allowed to receive compensation for damage caused to a
222. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 205 (1927); Lovell, The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1063 (1962).
223. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 222, at 206; see also 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 346-47 (1926).
224. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 223, at 347; Lovell, supra note 222, at 1065.
225. See 1 A. HANSON, LiEBL AND RELATED TORTS 2-3 (1969); Veeder, The History and
Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 558-59 (1903). These are precisely
the categories of words recognized in Virginia which constitute defamation per se. See supra

note 75.
226. See PROSSER, supra note 104, at 760; Veeder, supra note 225, at 571.
227. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 222, at 208; Lovell, supra note 222, at 1060-61;
Veeder, supra note 225, at 567.
228. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 222, at 209-10; Lovell, supra note 222, at 1059-61.
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it was no defense to libel:

"[T]he fact that it was true might make . . . [the defamation]

more likely to result in a breach of the peace-'for as the woman
said she would never grieve to have been told of her red nose if she
had not one indeed.' ,,230 Thus, while damage was the sole basis of
the common law action on the case for slander, insult and injury to
feelings played some part in the evolution of actions for libel.
When the Court of Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, common law courts assumed some part of the jurisdiction over actions
for libel.23 1 Rather than assimilate the two forms of action into

one, a clear distinction was made between the tort of libel for written defamation and the tort of slander for oral defamation.2 32
Written words were treated as actionable, even though they would
not be actionable if spoken.2 3
These rules governing actions for libel and slander were a part of
the common law of Virginia in the nineteenth century. 2 4 In addition, as a part of the Act of January 26, 1810, to suppress dueling,
the General Assembly provided a third remedy in damages for insulting words.233 Insult to the feelings of the offended party was
the gravamen of this action.2 Therefore, as with Star Chamber
policy,, the truth of the charge was no defense to the action, 3 7 although truth could be shown in certain circumstances to mitigate
damages. 3 "
An action under the insulting words statute was such a distinct
departure from common law defamation actions that the Virginia
Supreme Court held that an action for insulting words could not
be pleaded in the same count with common law slander. As for
words actionable at common law, whether slander or libel, the
229. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 222, at 210.
230. Id. (quoting W. Hudson, A Treatise of the Court of Star Chamber, reprinted in
Collectanea Juridica 1, 103 (London ca. 1792) (undated, printed for W. Clarke and Sons,
Law-Booksellers, Portugal Street, Lincolns Inn)).
231. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 223, at 361; Lovell, supra note 222, at 1068-69.
232. See King v. Lake, 145 Eng. Rep. 552 (Ex.Ch.1670); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
223, at 364-65; Lovell, supra note 222, at 1070; Veeder, supra note 225, at 569-70.
233. See Lovell, supra note 222, at 1070; Veeder, supra note 225, at 569-70.
234. See 4 J. MINOR, INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND STATUTE LAW 411-16 (2d ed. 1883); 2 C.
ROBINSON, THE PRACTICE IN COURTS OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 600-17
(1855); 2 H. TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 58-63 (1837).
235. See 4 J. MINOR, supra note 234, at 417; 2 C. ROBINSON, supra note 234, at 616.
236. See Brooks v. Calloway, 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 947, 949-50 (1841).
237. Id.
238. Moseley v. Moss, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 534, 546 (1850).
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court explained as follows:
The common law does not give reparation for all derogatory or disparaging words. To make such words actionable, unless special
damage be shewn, they must impute some offence against the law,
punishable criminally; or the having a contagious disorder tending
to exclude from society; or which may affect one injuriously in his
office or trust, or in his trade, profession or occupation; or which, in
the case of a libel or written slander, tend to make the party subject
to disgrace, ridicule or contempt. Words spoken that are merely vituperative, or insulting, or imputing only disorderly or immoral conduct, or ignoble habits, propensities or inclinations, or the want of
delicacy, refinement or good breeding, are not regarded by the common law as sufficiently substantial to be treated as injuries calling
for redress in damages. Thus it is not actionable to call a man a
villain, cheat, rascal, liar, coward or ruffian; to accuse him of swearing falsely, unless in a judicial proceeding; to charge him with a base
or fraudulent act, or with having been guilty of adultery, seduction,
or debauchery; or a woman with vulgarity, obscenity or incontinence; where such defamation bears only on the feelings or general
standing or reputation of the party implicated, and the misconduct
imputed has not been made punishable by statute. 23 9

Little more than a hundred years after this statement, actions in
Virginia for libel, slander, and insulting words had fused insofar as
rules of actionability were concerned. Words sued on had to be actionable per se to support an action, or else those words had to
have caused special damages.240 While, at the time, there may have
been some disagreement among the commentators that this fusion
of actions had occurred,24 1 there could be no doubt that this was
the law of Virginia following the decision in Shupe v. Rose's
Stores, Inc. 24 2' It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of
Virginia, in applying the common law rules of slander to all civil
actions for defamation, had reached the result recognized by Lord
Mansfield in 1812 as the logical direction the common law should
have taken.24 3
239. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
240. See Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 6-7, 82 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1954).
241. Compare Note, Defamation in Virginia-A Merger of Libel and Slander, 47 VA. L.
REV. 1116 (1961) with Doubles, Fusion of Libel and Slander-Quaere,2 U. RiCH. L. NoTEs

55 (1964).
242. 213 Va, 374, 192 S.E.2d 766 (1972). But see Crawford v. United Steel Workers, 230
Va. 217, 238-44, 335 S.E.2d 828, 841-45 (1985) (Russell, J., dissenting).

243. Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taut. 355, 128 Rev. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812).
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Analysis of the court's opinion in Fleming I reveals a careful recognition of the relatively unique nature of Virginia's defamation
law. For example, the court recognized that "[u]nlike most states,
Virginia makes no distinction between actions for libel and those
for slander, '244 and pointed out that "[b]ecause libel actions in
Virginia are governed by common law rules applicable to slander
24 5
actions, libel cases from other jurisdictions are not helpful.
Nowhere in the court's opinions in either Fleming I or Harrisis
there any discussion that this state of the law of Virginia should be
changed. But if a case can go to the jury on the plaintiff's testimony that he has been embarrassed and humiliated by written
words that are not defamatory per se, what is the effect on the law
of Virginia? Obviously, it means that the common law of libel-the
law set forth in those unhelpful cases from other jurisdictions-has
been reinstated, if it is sufficient for the plaintiff merely to plead
that words tending to subject him "to disgrace, ridicule or contempt" 246 have upset him emotionally. Beyond that, an entirely
new law of slander has been established. Oral words which are not
actionable per se nor the cause of pecuniary loss are actionable, if
they nevertheless upset the plaintiff. The effect here is to restore
the statutory doctrine of insulting words, and to change the gravamen of slander actions from damage to insult.
If the court really intended to abolish any meaningful distinction
between special and general damages, why, one must wonder, did
it spend so much time analyzing whether the offending words published by Fleming were defamatory per se or not? If, in fact, an
action based on a non-per se defamation can proceed on the same
proof of injury that will support a per se defamation case, the
court's effort to distinguish these two different types of defamatory
words was simply unnecessary and a waste of time. However,
Fleming I and Harris need not be read as intending this radical
alteration of Virginia law. In context, the court's reference to "special damages" as including damage to reputation and standing in
the community, embarrassment, humiliation, and mental suffering,
may have been meant as a reference to "actual damages," which
244. Fleming I, 221 Va. at 889, 275 S.E.2d at 635.
245. Id. at 890, 275 S.E.2d at 636. Most jurisdictions distinguish between libel and slander. Written words that on their face show a defamatory meaning are actionable per se
while spoken words must fall into one of the four traditional per se categories to be actionable without proof of special damages. See generally R. SACK, supra note 3, § 11.7.1, at 94.
246. See Moseley, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) at 538.
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are quite different from special damages, and the suggested fusion
of these two distinct types of injury may in fact have been
unintended. 4 7
The two sentences in Fleming I relating to the kind of damages
that are recoverable for a non-per se defamation are preceded by a
discussion of that portion of the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Gertz, considering what proof of damages must be offered to satisfy constitutional requirements. In Gertz, the Court
reversed the common law rule that damages could be presumed in
per se defamation cases and held that, in all cases, as a constitutional minimum, defamation plaintiffs are required to prove "actual injury. ' 24' Actual injury was defined by the Court to include
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish. 24 9 The Court did not, however, purport to
change the common law governing non-per se defamation cases,
but it is this discussion of injury in Gertz on which the Virginia
Supreme Court appears to rely in its discussion of special
damages.2 5 °
The possibility that the Virginia Supreme Court did not intend
to abolish the distinction between special and general damages is
further supported by the general state of confusion that appears to
exist over the effect of Gertz on the law of damages in defamation
actions. At least one commentator2 5 1 and several courts252 have
suggested that Gertz's elimination of presumed damages has effectively abolished the distinction between per se and non-per se
defamations.15' The requirement that special damages be pleaded
247. It is worth noting that a review of the briefs in Fleming I discloses that the issue was
not raised by either party.
248. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. As explained in Part I of this article, Great Coastal reinstated the doctrine of presumed damages in defamation cases involving no issue of public
concern. See supra text accompanying notes 79-90.
249. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
250. Indeed, in Harris the court refers to its decision in Fleming I that "actual injury
was not confined to pecuniary loss but included such elements as damage to reputation and
standing in the community, embarrassment, humiliation, and mental suffering." Harris,229
Va. at 13, 325 S.E.2d at 723 (emphasis added).
251. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1433-34 (1975).
252. See From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981),
review denied, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. Hilman, 285 Md. 161, ,
400 A.2d 1117, 1118-19 (1979); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 419
(Tenn. 1978).
253. Other courts have disagreed. See Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716 (1980); McCart v.
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and proved in non-per se actions is, according to some, no more
than an "antiquated survivor of a jurisdictional dispute between
the ecclesiastical and common law courts and makes no contempo25 4
rary sense.
It can be argued just as persuasively, however, that such reasoning is, in the words of one leading commentator, "unsound [because the] analysis seems to ignore the difference between 'actual
injury' or 'actual damages' on the one hand and 'special damages'
on the other. 2 55 In Virginia, the "antiquated" vestiges of this distinction no longer exist, as this commonwealth has long recognized
a consistent set of rules governing damages in all actions for defamation, regardless of whether the claim is for slander, libel, or insulting words. It is one thing to say, as did the Supreme Court in
Gertz, that damages may no longer be presumed, but it does not
necessarily follow that all defamatory words ought to be equally
actionable. Virginia has recognized four categories of words defamatory per se, which are thought to be generally more harmful than
other defamatory words. Although, after Gertz, damages resulting
from such words generally may not be presumed, there is nothing
illogical or unconstitutional in fashioning rules of actionability that
at least take into account the long-recognized belief that certain
kinds of words are more likely to cause harm and in providing
more forgiving rules of pleading and proof in such cases. In effect,
this is what Virginia's law of special damages has done, and it is
hard to believe that, in two short sentences of what is arguably
dictum, the Supreme Court of Virginia intended to effect so radical
a change as is suggested by the language in Fleming I and Harris.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By addressing a number of important questions in its recent
wave of decisions, the Supreme Court of Virginia has clarified
many areas of defamation law in the commonwealth. At the same
time, those opinions have unsettled certain areas thought to be
clear and have raised additional questions not previously considered in Virginia. Without doubt, the cases will provide grist for
Morris, 58 A.D.2d 700, 396 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1977).
254. Eaton, supra note 251, at 1435. The jurisdictional dispute to which Eaton refers resulted in most jurisdictions applying one set of rules to libel actions and a different set to
actions for slander. See supra note 245.
255. R. SACK, supra note 3, § 11.7.7.1, at 110; see also S. MErCALF, supra note 219, § 1013,
at 1-40.
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lawyers' arguments for some time to come. That uncertainty remains after the court's laudable effort to resolve so many open issues is not surprising, however. After all, the common law of defamation, with all of its considerable complexities, anomalies, and
vagueries, has been evolving for hundreds of years, while the courts
have had little more than twenty years to grapple with the constitutional overlay that was imposed by the United States Supreme
Court in 1964. In Virginia, while a good beginning has been made,
much remains to be done.

